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Abstract This article discusses urban conditions in cities that in 
their recent history experienced war. It puts the social component of 
the city into relationship with the destroyed and dangerous urban 
environment. In the period between 1992 and 1996 in Sarajevo and 
in other Bosnian cities, survival became the most important activity 
for citizens. In the period directly preceding the war, urban condi-
tions—mobility, infrastructure, and services—started to malfunc-
tion. As a result, ordinary city life became an object of new urban 
imageries influenced by new urban conditions and rules of behavior. 
The first bombing of the city on 6 April 1992 was a sign that the war 
had started. It brought with it war urban conditions: lack of public 
transport, electricity, water, and food. The inability of the city and 
the people living in it to function normally demanded new patterns 
of urban resilience, which were partly a product of the city’s prewar 
conditions. Using Sarajevo as a case study, this article examines 
whether the city had predisaster coping strategies and, if so, the 
extent to which these plans were used during the war. Finally, the 
article observes how citizens, with their own imageries about cities, 
can participate in the creation of patterns of urban resilience and 
future predisaster strategies.
Keywords patterns of urban resilience, Sarajevo, urban 
conditions, urban imageries, war
1 Introduction
The conflict between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
inaugurated the final phase of Yugoslavia’s dissolution began 
in the small towns and villages of rural Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In the course of 1992 Serbian forces positioned their artillery 
on the hills around Sarajevo. From the first bombing of the 
city on 6 April 1992, movement in the city was limited, 
unsafe, and life threatening. This sudden and violent change 
of the urban situation brought about new spatial organization, 
led to new understandings of the urban environment, forced 
development of new pathways for movement within the city, 
and drastically altered living patterns and rhythms within 
the urban fabric. Considering the fact that “war is easily dis-
tinguished from riots, revolution, and ubiquitous violence” 
(Vasquez 2009, 19), how do we approach war in its complex-
ity? Vasquez, in his book The War Puzzle Revisited, argues 
that the Webster’s Dictionary definition of a war—“a state of 
usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between 
states or nations”—leads us to think about the two World 
Wars or the Franco-Prussian War (Vasquez 2009, 22). He 
dedicates an entire chapter of his book to conceptualizing 
“war.” Vasquez analyzes many definitions of the term, 
studied by different authors in the fields of psychology, 
anthropology, politics, and sociology. He also relates social 
components to war: “What is considered war is a product of 
history—a product of the beliefs, formal and informal laws, 
and customs of particular period. This emphasizes the notion 
that war is a social invention, a fact created by an institution 
that takes certain actions and makes them a thing” (Vasquez 
2009, 19). War in former Yugoslavia started after the long 
political crisis between its federal states, first in Slovenia in 
1991 known as the Ten-Day War, then in Croatia in 1991, and 
moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992. While war in 
Slovenia ended after ten days, in the other two countries 
it continued for the next four years, causing great civilian 
causalities and structural and property destructions.
2 City of Sarajevo: Peace—War—Post 
War
This article focuses on Sarajevo and its urban war experience 
through analysis of urban conditions and social relations 
in prewar, war, and postwar periods. War became an urban 
subject, like any other activity related to the urban environ-
ment. The Sarajevo Survival Guide produced by FAMAi 
between 1992 and 1993 shows the city and life of its citizens 
in a resilient manner. It describes essential practices of 
people’s everyday lives in the format of an ordinary city 
guide. Efficient city functions in the before-, during-, and 
after-war periods change as does access to essential urban 
services. The article examines Sarajevo under siege from the 
perspective of its citizens and their changing imageries, and 
explores how everyday life was related to such basic urban 
functions as defense and security, mobility, information flow, 
public transport, as well as water, gas, and electricity sup-
plies. Also considered are food production and humanitarian 
aid and social relations and public cultural events. Ashwort 
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exemplified by citizens walking about in their city and feeling 
safe in its environment. As Lawson, Hawrylak, and Houghton 
maintain (2008, 171): “In an increasingly interdependent 
world, the security of people in one part of the world depends 
on the security of people elsewhere [. . .] The term itself has 
been associated with efforts to reduce people’s vulnerability 
to a broad array of risks ranging from attacks on civilian 
populations in civil wars to people’s social-psychological 
well-being.” Instead of thinking about peace as a single 
element, universality disappears and the creation of the 
patterns of urban resilience for the city independently from 
war becomes a very complex activity. “Peace is a historically 
determined process, a social construction of [a] political 
system—complete with rules of the game, allocation 
mechanisms, and decision games. Each historical period (and 
its global culture) has its own form of war and its own form 
of peace, and the nature of the peace will determine whether 
war can be avoided for a long or short period of time” (Vasquez 
2009, 288). Sarajevo in peacetimeiii was an important urban 
and cultural center, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and one of the states of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
To understand at which level the urban conditions of the 
city operated and to find out whether urban planning had 
treated war or any other disaster issues during the prewar 
period, several planning documents were consulted. In the 
Program of Construction and Urban Development of 
Sarajevo for the Period 1971–1985, for the first time there 
was a chapter related to the development of the city in terms 
of national defense and protection from natural hazards 
(Bokan, Stajović, and Vemić 1971). According to the authors 
of this chapter, the basic settings of urban planning should 
provide safety and protection in the urban area. They suggest 
that for the rapid mobilization and protection of the citizens 
and their material goods by evacuation from a threatened 
area, several factors can critically influence the survival of the 
population and effectiveness of its defense abilities. These 
include appropriate roads in the city and as connectors to 
nearby hinterland areas; the direct protection of citizens and 
their material goods by the construction of dual-purpose 
facilities that incorporate shelters; the proper location of the 
commercial buildings, infrastructure, and facilities for food 
supply, among others. 
Bokan, Stajović, and Vemić also conducted analysis on the 
existing urban context by providing observations on the orga-
nization of some urban functions. According to their analysis, 
Sarajevo airport’s location next to the Dobrinja neighborhood 
represented, in the case of a war, a constant danger for the 
inhabited parts of the city. This viewpoint was expressed 
largely because airports are often targets in war, and 
Sarajevo’s airport was built in such close proximity to 
residential areas. The center of the city, densely populated 
and occupied by buildings, from the old town of Baščaršija 
to Marijin Dvor, represented the most unfavorable area in 
terms of protection of the citizens in case of war and natural 
disasters. They assessed the planned and already existing 
(1991), in his book War and the City, writes about the difficul-
ties people have in accepting the city as a conflict-laden 
environment. This reluctance to envisage long-term, violent 
conflict as part of urban life calls into question whether 
urbanism and planning strategies have sufficient tools to 
prepare cities for the risks and conflicts of war and 
subsequent postwar recovery conditions. 
2.1 Urban Context
Sarajevo is a collection of cities: in some parts we can see a 
mosaic or puzzle city; in other parts we can find a built-it-
yourself city. This dualistic concept enables people who know 
the city already, as well as people who have never seen it, to 
create a powerful image of Sarajevo. The mosaic city concept 
is a metaphor that gives to Sarajevo an appearance of a 
territory that always has involved the coexistence of different 
religions, without building the ghettos, giving to the city a 
special cultural identity and image.ii The puzzle, however, is 
not constructed in a linear way, but is reconstructed again and 
again (Viganò 1999). To compose the puzzle or mosaic of 
Sarajevo, important facts from the past and present that create 
today’s image of the city should be mentioned. Sarajevo was 
an Ottoman city, an Austro-Hungarian city, a socialist city, 
an Olympic city, and a war city. At one and the same time, 
Sarajevo is a multicultural city, a postwar city, a physically 
fragmented city, and a culturally and administratively divided 
city. To Bollens (2001, 170) “Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is a special, transcendent place.” The Ottoman period lasted 
from 1435–1878, a period in which “the town was planned 
functionally” (Čengić 2003, xix). Private-individual housing 
and public activities were organized separately within the 
town. “The 300 meter wide river valley contained Čaršija—
the place for business and trade, while the foothills were filled 
with mahalas—residential quarters. The business part con-
tained a mosque, administrative court (saray), Orthodox and 
Catholic Church, Jewish synagogue, caravanserais—places 
for travelers to stay, [. . .] public baths, public dining halls, 
workshops, besistans—shopping centers, clock towers, ware-
houses and military barracks” (Čengić 2003, xix). Sarajevo’s 
urban territory developed gradually, starting from this small, 
early Ottoman nucleus. Later administrative and political 
authorities continued development by adding new parts to the 
city according to the needs of that historical moment. The city 
experienced a linear expansion on an east-west axis in the 
valley of the Miljacka River. Situated in the middle of this 
valley, Sarajevo is surrounded by hills and mountains, which 
are developed mostly in their lowest elevations for residential 
purposes. Like many other cities, it has a very complex urban 
identity, and through history has been often partially destroyed 
and rebuilt.
2.2 The City in Peacetime
Public evidence of a peaceful prewar urban environment are 
numerous and interdependent. At its most basic level this was 
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longitudinal spatial development of the city as problematic 
and unfavorable for the evacuation of the citizens. 
The overall study presented in this plan is in the form of 
guidelines. In constructing their recommendations, Bokan, 
Stajović, and Vemić assume that in big cities, some areas are 
under higher risk than others. Creating a plan of the city with 
the zones of higher and lower risks is important for the 
improvement of both shelter capacity and protection level. 
For infrastructure, water, and electricity supply, they recom-
mend, if possible, implementing self-supply stations, with 
each zone of the city accessible to at least two supply points. 
In part of the study there are also suggestions about how to 
protect the city’s inhabitants from nuclear attack. The most 
developed part of the study examines shelters for the people 
who remain in the city during a disaster period. Shelter space 
was calculated at 1.15 m2 per person. In order to plan adequate 
shelter capacity inside residential buildings and work places, 
each citizen should be guaranteed one shelter space at 
home or at work. The concluding part of the study proposed 
providing shelters in the central parts of the city by building 
dual-purpose facilities that could be actively used in peace-
time, such as underground garages, traffic roads, pedestrian 
tunnels, commercial and sport buildings, and places for 
culture and tourism activities. Home shelters should also be 
planned as dual-purpose buildings, inside the residential 
blocks or in the underground basements of kindergartens 
and schools. Shelters intended to protect material goods and 
serve special purposes (government bodies, communication 
services, military hubs) were expected to be built as massive 
buildings with a high level of protection. But the overarching 
recommendation was that all shelters should have a function 
in peacetime as well. 
This short study is unclear or underdeveloped on many 
points. Sometimes there is no difference made between what 
is already done and what should be a part of future planning. 
There are no maps within the document that for example 
indicate shelter facilities or evacuation roads. In another 
study, the Spatial Plan of the Canton of Sarajevo for the 
Period 2003–2023 (Institute for Planning of Development 
of the Sarajevo Canton 2006), there is only one page about 
citizens’ protection and material goods, which is divided in 
two chapters. The Mine Fields chapter provides brief infor-
mation on the overall size of the areas that were covered with 
mines during the last war. The other chapter, Vulnerability of 
the Area, provides a brief assessment of the danger of the area 
from war and natural and technical disasters. According to 
this plan the city of Sarajevo in 2006 had 241 shelters with a 
total area of 41,675 m2. Regarding war it says that there is no 
danger of any military actions due to the political stability of 
the region and the presence of international community. From 
these two documents, it can be concluded that Sarajevo did 
not and still do not really have predisaster risk-reduction 
strategies in city planning, or tools that could help the people 
to approach and resist disaster events. Ashwort argues that: 
“It is easy to appreciate that defense was [the] continuous 
and primary preoccupation of the city of the past and that the 
relict effects of past priorities have left impact upon the 
modern city” (Ashwort 1991, 202). 
Yugoslavia had the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) and 
a common defense strategy for the entire country. Inside the 
presidency on the federal level there was a military commis-
sion responsible for the command and control of the JNA 
(Dizdarević 2000). Thus, in Yugoslavian crises, the JNA 
had an important role.iv By the end of the 1980s, interstate 
political and military crises had emerged in the everyday lives 
of citizens. Transition from peace to war moved slowly. 
November 29 was celebrated across Yugoslavia as a state 
holiday, the day of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of the 
People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia).v Štraus describes the 
uneven observance of AVNOJ celebration in 1991: 
Today, it is not a holiday, not even working day [. . .] In 
Croatia today is a working day, like the AVNOJ in their his-
tory never existed, while in Serbia is a holiday for two days. 
The entire situation is a paradox. Croats accept the borders of 
the republics that had been drawn in Jajce, while the Serbs 
consider [the same] just administrative boundaries [. . .] 
Everyone takes what he wants, and interprets the situation as 
it suits him. Of this country [there] will not remain any trace. 
(Štraus 1995, 39)vi
This is one of the events through which citizens publicly 
get to know about the interstate political crisis and one of the 
moments when the collective imagination started to change. 
In popular culture, this was a big holiday; and in the citizens’ 
imagery, it was seen as a symbol of the unification of 
Yugoslavia, often celebrated by family holidays at the seaside 
and in the mountains. In 1991 and 1992, the Yugoslavian 
National Army began moving with all its equipment, tanks, 
soldiers, tracks, and so on from one city to another. In some 
locations, people were happy to see them, waving to the 
soldiers as they would during a military parade on a 
national holiday. In January 1992 Štraus writes: “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which was not on its own will, became the 
biggest military barrack of Europe with ten Yugoslavian Army 
Corpus on its territory” (Štraus 1995, 52).vii
For me, the war started on the day in 1992 when my 
classes in music school were canceled. I was there with my 
friend peering out the school window at the tanks passing, and 
waiting for my mother to pick me up and bring me home. 
Then I saw my father and his friend bringing home a lot of 
food of all kinds. Food reserves were decreasing and people 
tried to accumulate foodstuffs as much as possible, even 
though no one knew for how long we should ready ourselves 
with stockpiled supplies.
2.3 City in Wartime
When did the transition from peace to war end? How can one 
identify the existence of a war situation and how should one 
adapt to it? At the personal level everyone has his/her own 
story related to the war beginning. Image of the city started to 
change rapidly, lacking essential urban services. New way of 
life and new spatial practices were introduced. To stay alive 
and to survive was the occupation of all the citizens. 
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2.3.1 On Defense and Security
On 1 March 1992, as a result of a citizens’ referendum, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina became an independent country, 
recognized by the United Nations as a “subject and object 
of the international law” (Del Giudice, Krstanović, and 
Kovačević 1995, 161). What was happening in the city of 
Sarajevo two days later? Štraus writes: 
Barricades of Serbs who came down from the surrounding 
hills on 1st and 2nd of March, and blocked the most important 
traffic crossroads and streets in all directions for entire second 
day was something [. . . to make the] blood freeze if you 
think what could degenerate from this. And then a wonderful, 
magnificent, completely unexpected turn happened. Citizens 
of Sarajevo, some from the east, the others from the west—in 
the early evening, with children and candles, walk towards 
barricades demanding that peace return to the city. The heroes 
on barricades in panic run away in all directions, most of them 
to the slopes of Trebević, and in the night through Sarajevo 
were walking citizens, old and young, happy that the 
bloodshed was stopped. (Štraus 1995, 62)viii
After the referendum, problems began for the United 
Nations troops stationed in Sarajevo. A massive citizens’ 
peace demonstration took place at the beginning of April. It 
lasted three days, and on the dawn of April 5, Serbian snipers 
attacked the people. The first victims fell. Even though 
the citizens had expressed their anti-war position, in 1992 
Sarajevo was besieged and for four years the city suffered 
countless bombs, gunfire, and attacks by tanks. Urban 
development of the city in the valley of the Miljacka River, 
surrounded by hills and mountains, following the natural 
landscape was a perfect situation for the siege of the city. On 
the hills and mountains appeared: 
Two hundred and sixty tanks, one hundred and twenty 
mortars, and innumerable anti-aircraft cannons, sniper rifles 
and other small arms. All of that was entrenched around the 
city, facing it. At any moment, from any of these spots, any 
of the arms could hit any target in the city. And they did, 
indeed—civilian housing, museums, churches, cemeteries, 
people on the streets. Everything became a target. All 
exits from the city, all points of entry, were blocked. (FAMA 
1993, 5)
The interesting image of interplay between the urban and 
rural landscapes turned into a hostile confrontation, rural 
against urban, creating two fields of action distinguished by 
different strategies and different narratives: destruction and 
survival (Mazzucchelli 2010). 
While the government of the newly-independent, and now 
at-war, Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to organize territorial 
defenseix of the state capital, the citizens started to adapt 
their everyday life to the new war geography of the city. The 
evidence for the existence of such a new geography is the 
Sarajevo Survival Map created by FAMA. The map contains 
text legends and portrayals of the siege elements: types of 
guns surrounding the city, the anti-sniper protection walls, 
a secret underground tunnel, survival gardens, and other 
strategic urban elements (Figure 1). 
2.3.2 Conditions of Urban War and Everyday 
Resilience in Practice
Can a city be imagined and planned for a war? The city as 
battle terrain can be a subject of urban siege and urban battle. 
That was the case of Sarajevo, even if Ashwort (1991) in his 
book War and the City notes that a city as a battle terrain 
should be avoided. He gives a separate analysis of urban siege 
and urban battle, where for the sieges “the objective is the city 
itself,” while urban battles “are conflicts in which one of the 
participants has the characteristics of an irregular force of one 
sort or another” (Ashwort 1991, 114). In both cases war to 
and in the city is the war against the people and the city. In 
urban terms “the siege—strategy par excellence of the ‘war 
to the city,’ urbicide—paradoxically becomes a moment 
when hidden structure of the urban form unveil more clearly” 
(Mazzucchelli 2010, 167).x Some parts of the neighborhoods 
inside the city of Sarajevo, such as Grbavica and Dobrinja, 
were divided in two, so the front line was inside and in 
between the buildings, or on the opposite river sides (attack 
and defense). 
The city, although unsafe, itself became a survival 
resource. The previous peacetime functions of the buildings 
took on new functions as urban shelters—for family, public, 
and spontaneous general uses. Many buildings’ wartime use 
changed from their peacetime functions. For example, schools 
often were used as refuge shelters. Instead of meeting in 
classrooms, the children had classes in apartments, under-
ground shelters, and building staircases. The urban green 
areas were turned into urban gardens and cemeteries. The 
trees in the city were used for heating and cooking. The city 
was constantly transformed under the dual pressures of mili-
tary destruction on the one side and survival strategies on the 
other side. The image of a war city grew day by day. At 
the very beginning, detonations broke the glass windows of 
the buildings. People sealed their windows by using UNHCR 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) plastic 
foil that was mainly provided for this purpose.
Life in the city occurred on two vertically divided levels: 
the overground city and the underground city. The overground 
city was an extremely dangerous, high-risk battlefield. 
People’s movements were reduced to a minimum, and then 
only carried out to satisfy essential needs such as acquiring 
food and heating supplies. In contrast, the underground city 
became more used as the place where people spent most of 
their time. Their life routines and activities began moving 
to the underground or semi-underground levels: sleeping, 
eating, playing, cooking, creating culture, and so forth. Ordi-
nary everyday life turned into total emergency. Besides for 
hiding from bombing, new underground living spaces needed 
to be adapted for everyday living.
2.3.3 On Mobility—People Transport and Information 
Flow
When the war started, public transport in the city literally 
stopped. Sarajevo airport, controlled by the United Nations 
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Protection Force, was the only possible way to enter and exit 
from the city. As Sontag remembers her experience in the 
city: “To leave Sarajevo and an hour later, to be in a ‘normal’ 
city (Zagreb). To get into a taxi (taxi!) at the airport. . . to drive 
along streets where the traffic is regulated by traffic signs, 
to drive along streets and watch buildings with the roofs 
untouched, the walls undamaged by grenades, with glass 
in the windows. . .” (Sontag 1997, 13). The main tramline in 
Sarajevo follows the longitudinal line of the city, from east 
to west. Buses and trolleys were also routed through the 
neighborhoods in the valley. Sarajevo had a cable railway that 
connected the old town and mountain Trebević. But none of 
these systems could continue to operate due to the military 
attacks, electricity cutoffs, and overall passenger security. 
The whole city was under constant sniper attack and 
bombing; citizens moved in the city by foot and by bicycles. 
According to the Sarajevo Survival Guide: 
City transportation—trams, buses, vans, trolleys, cable rail-
way—does not exist [. . .] Cars are running, if run by or for 
officials. Most were taken away from private owners, with or 
without a receipt, especially if they ran on diesel. New models 
appeared, homemade armored cars, which look like moving 
closets, only with a hole in front of the driver. They are slow, 
shaky and loud. (FAMA 1993, 58) 
To transport bulky items such as wood for heating or 
water, people used wheelbarrows, self-built transport 
boxes, baby carriages, and children sleds in the wintertime 
(Figure 2). 
Citizens started to move around their city differently, 
hiding from danger, walking in the areas that were protected 
from sniper fire. Also “the topography of the city has been 
redefined in function of the careful observer, who in front had 
a city, an unrevealed spectacle; the ‘visual cones’ of snipers 
determined which parts of the cities are forbidden and which 
parts are ‘safe’” (Mazzucchelli 2010, 167),xi see Figure 3. 
There were a myriad of spatial strategies employed to protect 
people from sniping attacks, including running across the 
open crossroads (Figure 4 (top)). Other tactical solutions 
included erecting temporary high walls made from the 
remains of burned cars and metal fences, walking next to 
United Nations armored cars, and suspending large colored 
linen sheets as visual screens between buildings (Figure 4 
(bottom)).
In 1993, under the Sarajevo airport an underground 
corridor, whose entrance was inside the private house of the 
Kolar family, was built. The Tunnel (as it was called) became 
crucial to Sarajevo’s efforts to avoid a total siege of the city 
by the Serbian army. It was used mainly for military purposes 
Figure 1. Survival map of Sarajevo, 1992–1996
Source: ©FAMA Collection. Reprinted with permission of FAMA International.
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and to bring food, fuel, medicine, and weapons into the city. 
Sometimes it was also used in the opposite direction to bring 
the severely injured out from the city. 
The flow of information and the methods of being 
informed became complicated as well. Phone lines were cut 
off immediately at the beginning of the war. Oslobodjenje 
was the only newspaper printed during the war, in reduced 
size and limited editions. Several radio stations broadcast 
programs 24 hours a day. As FAMA reports in the Sarajevo 
Survival Guide: “Rumors are the most important source 
of information. They spread with incredible speed and 
often mean more than news transmitted through the official 
Figure 3. Details from the Sarajevo Survival Map
Note: Red circles mark the zones that were under sniping attack. On this map are also visible protection walls from sniper, people in the queues for water, people 
providing wood, and so on.
Source: ©FAMA Collection. Reprinted with permission of FAMA International.
Figure 2. Alternative transport with decorations (left); baby carriage for water transport (right)
Photographs by Z. Kanlić, 12 April 1992. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
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channels. They regularly—‘this time for sure’—report on 
military intervention, on the siege of the city being lifted, on 
establishing corridors and safe havens” (FAMA 1993, 29).
2.3.4 Lifelines—On Infrastructure, Water, Gas, and 
Electricity Supply
Once citizens got used to the war and the danger present in the 
external environment, the next important area to deal with 
was the search for resilient coping strategies in their own 
homes (Figure 5).
The top drawing shows an apartment for four to five 
family members where all the daily activities and duties of 
the family at home in the peace time could occur. Family 
members slept in the bedrooms on the left side, while cooked, 
ate, rested, and enjoyed their free time on the right side of the 
apartment. The bottom drawing shows how the organization 
of the apartment had changed due to the war circumstances 
and the new habits and needs for survival activities. Dining, 
living, talking, hiding, cooking, sleeping, and so on was 
organized in one quarter of the space of the apartment, where 
through the empty socket of a window a makeshift chimney 
was attached to a wood-burning stove. In the place of the 
kitchen, dining table, small bedroom, and toilet there were 
rainwater collection barrels, a sandbag protection wall, and 
wood chopping area. In the place of the living room there was 
a bicycle and alternative objects for transporting different 
stuff, and a little garden in flowerpots. 
In Sarajevo, “throughout the siege, the destruction of 
electric, gas, phone line and water facilities has been used as 
a weapon against the inhabitants of the city” (United Nations 
Commission of Experts 1994). Lifelines no longer functioned; 
drinking water was lacking; electricity and gas shortages 
were interconnected influences on everyday life. Sarajevo 
had several main water stations that supplied the city using a 
centralized main pumping system, which was dependent on 
electrical power. During the war, water cutoffs were frequent 
and could last for days or weeks, due to a lack of electricity or 
episodic structural damage. The old water fountains, dating 
from Ottoman rule and located in Old Town, together with a 
few functioning remaining water sources, became the only 
water supply alternatives in deficit periods. The queues for 
water were long and dangerous, often attacked by sniper and 
shellfire from the besieging forces. These attacks on many 
occasions resulted in the deaths of many civilians. People’s 
vulnerability was even higher because they were obliged to 
carry the water for long distances between the water sources 
and their homes. In the Sarajevo Survival Guide, water is 
placed in the category of essential needs. And regarding 
alternative water sources, such as rain, 
[. . .] it is the rain that brings consolation. Groove gutters are, 
unfortunately, damaged. People stand in line, in the rain, wait-
ing with buckets for their portion of rainwater. Day or night—
it doesn’t really matter. People drink it and use it for doing 
laundry. It is very good for your hair, which becomes silky 
and shiny. . . They ration water as if they were Bedouins. 
Long hair can be washed in a liter and a half, the whole 
body in two or three—all in little pots and pans, with water 
lukewarm or cold. (FAMA 1993, 13)
Being without electricity and gas for heating became the 
norm in besieged Sarajevo. Only the light of shell bursts, 
tracer bullets, and the fires that broke out in damaged 
buildings disrupted the presence of eternal darkness in the 
nighttime city. At the beginning of the war, as an alternative 
Figure 4. People running in a place that was dangerous 
from sniper attacks (top); large colored linen suspended 
between buildings (bottom)
Photographs by Z. Kanlić, 1992. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
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residential buildings did not have chimneys, so everyone was 
obliged to make his own flues to guide the smoke out of 
the window. Balconies were also used for cooking and as 
open-air refrigerator in the wintertime. On the small river in 
the Alipasino Polje neighborhood, people fashioned self-
made water mills to produce electricity (Figure 7). Many 
public institutions, such as hospitals, used diesel-powered 
generators.
for electric light, people used candles. But as time passed, 
they invented all sorts of oil lamps. For cooking and heating, 
they used self-made tin stoves (Figure 6).
Fuel was provided by wood from the city’s green areas, 
books, old shoes, furniture, and any found, flammable object. 
After the second winter under siege, all the city’s trees that 
people could reach were burned for domestic purposes. Every 
house had a minimum of two stoves of different sizes. Many 
Figure 5. An average Sarajevo apartment before the war (top) and during the war (bottom)
Source: Association of Architects of Bosnia and Herzegovina.xii Reprinted with permission of the Association.
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Figure 6. Heating and cooking stoves
Photographs by Z. Kanlić, 23 May 1993. Reprinted with permission from 
Z. Kanlić.
Figure 7. Water mill for generating electricity
Photograph by Z. Kanlić, 15 September 1993. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
2.3.5 On Food Provision—Production and the Lack 
Thereof
The problem of food sufficiency emerged at the very begin-
ning of the war. All regular shops closed and a black market 
developed (Figure 8). People finished their limited food 
reserves very quickly. Some open city markets continued 
to function with reduced foodstuffs in stock, but these 
commercial institutions often were the subjects of artillery 
attacks and damaged or destroyed by shelling. Because the 
siege of Sarajevo was very long, the city came to depend on 
humanitarian aid, which included food and non-food items 
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Figure 8. Market on the street, selling foodstuffs and other 
items 
Photograph by Z. Kanlić, 1992. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
Figure 9. Shelter, theater play performed in a shelter 
Photograph by Z. Kanlić, 1992. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
managed by the United Nations and its agencies. Food arrived 
in Sarajevo by humanitarian airlift at the city airport. The 
besieging forces often blockaded these humanitarian aid 
deliveries. 
This article is not to reconstruct how well the humanitarian 
aid system functioned during the siege in Sarajevo. It focuses, 
rather, on what alternatives citizens utilized to meet their 
nutritional needs. City bakeries, even with many difficulties, 
continued to produce bread. When there was no electricity, 
the bakeries ran on diesel-powered generators. In case there 
was no fuel to make bread, flour was distributed to the 
citizens (Del Giudice, Krstanović, and Kovačević 1995). One 
of the widely adopted practices was to exchange personal 
possessions, like jewelry and electrical goods, for food. 
Everywhere in the city, people started urban gardening on 
their balconies, in their flowerpots, and on the green areas in 
between residential blocks that were protected from shelling 
and snipers. 
Many of these urban gardeners sold their vegetables 
or traded them for other items. Food preparation always 
depended on the available ingredients, and “a war cookbook 
emerged spontaneously, as a survival bestseller. Recipes 
spread throughout the city very quickly. People are healthy, in 
spite of everything, for no one eats animal fat anymore, nor 
meat, nor cheese—meals are made without eggs, without 
milk, onions, meat, vegetables” (FAMA 1993, 19). The food 
to eat was simpler than ever before.
2.3.6 On the Art of Living by Creating Public Culture
In Sarajevo occurred art of survival, war art, and art in 
and about dangerous environments, which could be named 
resilient art. One of the aims of a siege as a war strategy is to 
breakdown civilian moral and the will to resist. It impacts 
everything from art to everyday life. Searching for water, 
standing in a queue, looking for the best way to transport this 
bulky, heavy necessity, optimizing water consumption, and 
reusing waste water as many times as possible consumes 
a very large portion of a person’s available time. Resolving 
all other problems: food preparation—cooking the same 
ingredient in ten different ways, fabricating the objects for 
heating and lighting, . . ., imagining the peace are time 
demanding activities but not on the same scale as water acqui-
sition. “The culture helped citizens to survive. The theater 
halls were opening and closing depending on the days and 
danger” (Matvejević and Stoddart 1995, VIII).xiii At the 
beginning of the war on 17 May 1992 the Sarajevo War 
Theater (Sarajevski ratni teatar—SARTRxiv) was founded. 
One of their plays was named Shelter, which actors performed 
in the shelters in different neighborhoods in Sarajevo 
(Figure 9). 
Cultural production was influenced by and made under 
war circumstances, in which the artists approached the 
psychological side of the siege and with their works reflected 
what was happening in the city. “How did it start? After the 
initial confusion, artist [sic], theater workers, actors, direc-
tors, musicians, poets, writers, film workers, and all others 
who remained in this city stood up as one person to defend the 
integrity of the country and this city” (Karamehmedović 
1997, 64). Artists were highly motivated to exhibit, to 
perform, to play music, and more. Everything could be viewed 
as an experiment. Cultural events happened in all kinds of 
spaces: important destroyed or burned buildings, people’s 
homes, shelters, repaired open spaces (Figure 10).
Despite dangerous and life threatening conditions cultural 
life was very important and necessary survival activity as 
well. It helped people to keep alive their memories of the past, 
while enhance their hopes for a better future.
2.4 The City after the War
Can war ever be avoided, or is humanity condemned to a 
history of war and a struggle for power? (Vasquez 2009).
The physical and cultural city that existed immediately 
after the war represented an evolutionary response to the 
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Figure 10. Art exhibition in the burned central post office
Photograph by Z. Kanlić, 1993. Reprinted with permission from Z. Kanlić.
many emergency conditions that appeared during the war. 
The evolved city was an urban ruin: dirty, fragmented, 
divided, dangerous, and different. The transition from war to 
peace often can be a very long and complicated process. 
In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the war’s end was 
purely a political act, based on negotiations and the trading 
of the country’s territory. By signing the Dayton Peace 
Agreementxv in 1995, the war officially ended in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. By the terms of the treaty, the country’s prewar 
territory was divided into two entities: a Republic of Srpska, 
where there was a Serb majority, and the predominantly 
Muslim and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The creators of the peace accord that divided Bosnia into 
two entities used maps with a scale of 1:600,000. From this 
example we can see the highly generalized level at which 
politicians thought about the future of the territory, city, and 
people living there. The international communityxvi continued 
to be present in the Bosnian territory to oversee and follow 
through with the civilian aspects of the peace accord, to 
guarantee the peaceful stabilization of the territory, and to 
help the reconstruction of life and infrastructure. A new 
emergency could be found in the processes of reconstruction, 
the removal of mines from the countryside and the cities, the 
return of refugees to their prewar homes, and the promotion 
of reconciliation and state building. Shortly after the war in 
1996, a visitor who spent some time in Sarajevo wrote: “The 
city was as small as ever, easily walkable; the scale of the 
body, well attuned to restrictions in public transportation that 
it always despises anyway, was the scale of the action. Open 
to buses from several directions, closed to trains and 
planes that could carry ‘real people’ [. . .] the former capital of 
uncertainty was breathing easier, yet not certain of anything 
in particular” (Wagner 1997, 9). The bombing had stopped, 
and infrastructure (not immediately in all parts of the city) 
had started to “function”: public transport, electricity, gas, 
and water became regularly available. It was possible to buy 
many food products for affordable prices. The situation had 
changed; the most important survival needs during the war 
became the basic needs in the peacetime. And postwar 
citizens? Their imagined peace had come true, but how far 
could their imagination of the future extend in this divided, 
destroyed city, located in a divided, destroyed country, 
governed by the international community?
3 Urbanism: Resilience and War
Relying on the analysis of the urban conditions of the city of 
Sarajevo in prewar, war time, and postwar periods, this study 
has searched for the elements that can be related to resilient 
urbanism and planning. The citizens’ experiences of everyday 
life in war help us to understand resilience in practice in 
the urban environment. “The city presents a range of targets 
distinguished not only by their physical density, but also by 
their practical and symbolic importance” (Ashwort 1991, 88). 
After 11 September 2001, the need for urban resilience in 
cities against human threats, and against terrorism specifi-
cally, became an acute concern. The United Nations Interna-
tional Strategy for Disaster Reduction definition of resilience 
is “The ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from 
the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, 
including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions” (UNISDR 2007). 
Coaffee, Wood, and Rogers (2009) present an overview of 
resilience definitions. They are all very similar and their 
key words are: capacity, adjust/adapt, recovery, and hazards/
threats. The most interesting resilience explanation they 
present is from the UK Government, which derives from a 
national policy perspective, that is, ability of the country to 
detect, to prevent and respond with speed and certainty to 
major emergencies, including terrorist attacks. They also give 
an example of resilience at the urban level that has been 
adopted by the United States as a national policy since 2003 
about the protection of “lifelines”: system of roads, utilities, 
and other support facilities, designed to continue their 
functioning during natural disasters and terrorist attacks. In 
The Responsible Urban Planner chapter, Coaffee, Wood, 
and Rogers relay Godschalk’s arguments about a process of 
designing resilient cities. “He notes that: If we are to take the 
achievement of urban resilience seriously, we need to build 
the goal of the resilient city into the everyday practice of 
city planners, engineers, architects, emergency managers, 
developers and other urban professionals. This will require a 
long-term collaborative effort to increase knowledge and 
awareness about resilient city planning and design” (Coaffee, 
Wood, and Rogers 2009, 238–39). It is difficult to consider 
that urban resilience could be a universal concept. It can vary 
depending on national policies, disaster history, and security 
priorities of the single country. If we imagine that the contem-
porary resilient city is a complex system supported by 
urban and social resilience, where does one search for its 
elements?
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3.1 Developing the Patterns of Urban Resilience
Assuming that the patternxvii of urban resilience is a combina-
tion of the creative and innovative spatial practices found 
in everyday life, social rules and values, and thoughts on 
disaster risk in urban environments. In the book A Pattern 
Language, patterns are presented as entities that create 
elements of this language: “Each pattern describes a problem 
which occurs over and over again in our environment” 
(Alexander et al. 1997, x), “No pattern is an isolated entity” 
(Alexander et al. 1997, xiii). Individual patterns could be seen 
as a relation between problem and solution, “but in a very 
general and abstract way—so that you can solve the problem 
for yourself, in your own way, by adapting to your prefer-
ences, and the local conditions at the place where you are 
making it” (Alexander et al. 1997, xiii). In the case of 
Sarajevo we could add that making a pattern in your own way 
was also based on the needs for everyday life and living 
in such extreme conditions, not only adapted to your own 
preferences. According to Viganò, patterns leave room for 
innovation, but they can be extremely difficult to govern 
(Viganò 1999). To position the research for patterns of urban 
resilience based on experiences from Sarajevo, the pattern 
analysis by Bobić is of particular relevance. Bobić wrote 
referring to the book A Pattern Language in Archis: “A pat-
tern language can be approached at two levels. It can be seen 
as a manual for do-it-yourself city, or as a large memorandum 
of what the city should be: a place for people, made by people 
themselves” (Bobić 1996, 60). Materialization, form, and 
function of patterns of urban resilience have an unlimited 
number of possibilities.
3.2 The Examples of Patterns of Urban Resilience
The space strategies used to protect people from sniper 
attacks in Sarajevo could be named contemporary city fortifi-
cation and protection. The main element of such fortifications 
is a contemporary temporary urban wall. They can be mobile, 
free standing, or fixed onto the walls of the opposite build-
ings. It is a temporary pattern of urban resilience. Their 
general size, length, height, and thickness depend on the 
accessible materials and the level of protection needed. Urban 
walls have medieval origins and were constructed to protect 
towns. The main characteristic of a medieval wall is “protec-
tion made permanent and regular” (Mumford 1997, 16). 
Today to plan such fortifications in order to protect a certain 
city would be impossible. Instead, contemporary temporary 
urban walls rely on the existing urban fabric of which it 
becomes a part, closing the space between existing buildings. 
When a period of risk has ended, these walls can be 
removed. 
This is exactly what happened in Sarajevo: contemporary 
temporary urban walls were made from destroyed cars, huge 
linens (Figure 4), metal boards, and other available materials. 
“To inhabit the spaces of walls, edges, peripheries, borders, 
and the “in-between”—the spaces of the extreme conditions 
brought into being radical transformations—is not a matter 
of creating entirely new knowledge, even less of discarding 
existing ideas or systems of knowing, but rather a matter of 
expanding them, precisely at their former, or present, limits” 
(Woods 1997, 13). The citizens of Sarajevo practiced every-
day resilience while providing water, food, and heating fuel. 
The same can be said for the construction of different objects 
for domestic use, which could help them to survive, such as 
the innovations employed for transportation, heating, and 
lighting during the night (Figure 11). Each object was an 
adaptation of some already existing object, partially changing 
its original shape and giving it a new and different use as 
well.
The collection of rainwater and the generation of electric-
ity from water mills installed on the river is another example 
of a pattern of urban resilience. The people in Sarajevo 
collected rainwater individually with plastic buckets, or 
generated electricity from self-built water mills on the 
river. However, there could have been other, more resilient 
strategies. Renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, 
rainwater or stream water could be used in resilient urban 
planning. 
During periods of heightened disaster risk, and especially 
during war, city authorities should guarantee mobile urban 
services, not only sanitation units, but food markets or mobile 
service for the humanitarian aid distribution. The reason is 
that during disasters, cities become fragmented and vulnera-
ble territory. One of the characteristics of the pattern of urban 
resilience is mobility, which can guarantee better security 
conditions to the people. Urban services should reach the 
people independently at the location where they live in the 
city. 
The Sarajevo Survival Guide and Sarajevo Survival Map 
(Figure 1) made by FAMA represent a new form of guide to 
the topography of life and death. It has to do with imaginary 
representations of non-existing urban plans. This example 
could be used in resilient urban planning, where the city 
planners try to represent disaster risks on maps, imagine 
vulnerable or secure zones of the city, indicate existing 
shelters, propose different combinations of alternative roads 
and stops for mobile urban services, and so on. “As the prac-
tices of different urban world[s] intersect, new, provisional, 
and often ephemeral urban worlds are made” (Simone 2004, 
240). This operation is very similar to those carried out in the 
exercises of students in architecture and planning schools. 
The only difference is that students often imagine in their 
projects the optimal and most beautiful situations for cities. 
Considering how complex the subject of resilience is in cities 
in emergent circumstances, the conclusion would be that we 
need interdisciplinary approaches to develop our resilient 
cities. One part of that interdisciplinary treatment could be the 
idea of constant research for and development of the patterns 
of urban resilience that could be imagined as constitutive 
elements for resilient city planning, where it is not possible to 
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Figure 11. Invented objects for domestic use during the war
Image: Association of Architects of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Reprinted with permission of the Association.
decide the quantity of resilience, because the resilience as 
imagining is a progressive condition.
4 Conclusion
Comparing the definitions of urban resilience already 
mentioned above and the war experience of the people in the 
city of Sarajevo, it is difficult to find the connections between 
theory and the experienced reality. During the war a planned 
city slowly and literally disappeared and for the citizens 
urban resilience became a subject to learn. The different 
processes of urban life that govern a city at war in the end 
created an imagined city. Where does one search for the 
connections between these two urban entities: the planned 
and the imagined city? If we take from Sarajevo’s experience 
the examples that represent patterns of urban resilience, the 
main consideration would be which patterns, and how many 
of them, could be used in some other urban war location in the 
world. Perhaps this could confirm the nature of the proposed 
concept of the pattern of urban resilience that is a combina-
tion of the creative and innovative spatial practices for every-
day life, social rules and values, and thoughts on disaster risk 
in urban environments. Then patterns of urban resilience 
would have general characteristics learned from the locations 
that experienced war or natural disaster in relation to the over-
all context for which these patterns are intended to be planned 
and used. From the Sarajevo example, we can see that urban 
resilience was present everywhere, especially in the cultural 
life of the citizens. Planning for urban resilience and resilient 
city planning should not only be concentrated on the essential 
urban functions, such as water, gas, food, and electricity 
supply. Based on the Sarajevo example, it is possible to con-
clude that it is difficult to plan a total, complete, and definitive 
urban resilience system, because so much of the resilience 
required appeared spontaneously from within the Sarajevo 
population. Maybe a city and its people can be prepared for 
the worst case scenarios of eventual war or natural disaster. 
But the reaction and behavior of the citizens once disaster 
happened cannot be planned. Finally, any resilient city should 
have a basic urban resilience plan, which can help at the very 
beginning of a disaster to respond positively to disruption. 
Such a plan can provide a good base from which to lessen 
material damage in a city, and as a consequence should reduce 
loss of human lives.
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Notes
i FAMA (“report” in Latin) is an independent production company 
founded in the prewar period, worked primarily in audio and video 
media. It was the organization that produced the Sarajevo Survival 
Guide and Sarajevo Survival Map. The contributors of the Sarajevo 
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Survival Guide are Miroslav Prstojević (text), Željko Puljić 
(photos), Nenad Dogan (design), Maja Razović (editor), Aleksan-
dra Wagner (editor and translator), and Ellen-Elias Bursać (transla-
tor). The contributors of the Sarajevo Survival Map are Suada 
Kapić (author), Ozren Pavlović (graphic designer/illustrator), 
Drago Resner (photographer), Nihad Kresevljakovic (text author), 
Emir Kasumagić (editor), and Vanja Matković (translator). Today 
FAMA is registered as FAMA International and FAMA Collection 
represents a virtual bank of knowladge dedicated to the Siege of 
Sarajevo 1992–1996.
ii Muslims, Jews, Roman Catholics, and Orthodox Christians have 
lived in Sarajevo’s territory since the beginning of Ottoman rule. 
iii In this part I refer to Sarajevo in 1990 and before. 
iv For more details see Dizdarević 2000, From Death of Tito to Death 
of Yugoslavia, Testimonies, Chapter X: The Role of the Military 
Forces in Yugoslavian Crisis. 
v During the second session of AVNOJ in Jajce in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on 29 November 1943, its members decided on 
Federalization of Yugoslavia. Until its dissolution, the countries 
involved were: Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and two autonomous provinces Kosovo 
and Vojvodina.
vi Translated from Bosnian to English by the author.
vii Translated from Bosnian to English by the author.
viii Translated from Bosnian to English by the author.
ix Since the beginning of the siege, the First Corps Sarajevo served as 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) defensive force in and around 
Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the First Corps Sarajevo 
as superior to the besieging forces in infantry numbers, but clearly 
deficient in its firepower. The besieging forces, the Sarajevo 
Romanija Corps, is the Bosnian Serb force of the Bosnian Serb 
Army (BSA), which had surrounded the city since the beginning of 
the siege. It is the successor of the same unit of the Yugoslavian 
National Army (JNA), which occupied the same position until May 
1992. There are indications that early in the siege, the JNA was 
involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. Bosnian officials frequently 
charged that JNA tanks joined Bosnian Serb forces in barrages, 
and that the JNA provided the Bosnian Serb forces with logistical 
support and protection. In late April 1992, the BiH government 
ordered the withdrawal of all JNA forces from its soil. The govern-
ment in Belgrade announced that it would withdraw from BiH all 
troops who were not residents of the Republic. Since most of the 
JNA troops in BiH were Serbs of Bosnian nationality, this with-
drawal policy reportedly had little effect. Some 80,000 Yugoslav 
soldiers were thereafter transferred with their equipment to the 
Territorial Defense Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (SRBiH) (United Nations Commission of Experts 
1994).
x Translated from Italian to English by the author.
xi Translated from Italian to English by the author.
xii These drawings are part of the exhibition that in February 1995 was 
on view at Parsons School of Design in Greenwich Village. Exhibi-
tion Sarajevo Dream and Reality “presents 14 projects by student 
architects and professionals from Sarajevo that respond creatively 
to the city’s destruction” (Muschamp 1995). The exhibition was 
made in 1994 by members of the Association of Architects of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and curated by Professor Rajka Mandić. 
xiii Translated from Italian to English by the author.
xiv http://www.sartr.ba/.
xv The Dayton Peace Accord was an initiative launched by the United 
States in the autumn of 1995. Proximity negotiations between 
the warring parties, represented by Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovic, opened at the Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on 1 November 1995. The three 
Balkan presidents formally signed the document on 14 December 
1995 in Paris (SETimes.com. 2005).
xvi Office of the High Representative (OHR) appointed by the United 
Nations is an ad hoc international institution responsible for over-
seeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-
info/default.asp?content_id=38519). The role of SFOR (Operation 
Joint Guard / Operation Joint Forge) was to stabilize the peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This operation was brought to a success-
ful end on 2 December 2005, which was the launch date of the 
European Union’s follow-on EUFOR (http://www.nato.int/sfor/). 
There were also many nongovernmental organizations working on 
the civil reconstructions, human rights issues, and different relief 
projects.
xvii For the explanation of patterns I rely on the books Elementary City 
by Viganò published in 1999 and A Pattern Language by Alexan-
der et al. published in 1997, and the Archis article A Timless Pattern 
Language by Bobić, published in 1996.
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